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I wish to thank Graham Oppy for clarifying his earlier attempt to “pro-
vide a general ground for objecting to all modal theistic arguments” by show-
ing that any such argument “must be question-begging.” In hindsight, Oppy 
now admits “it is not clear” that even his clarified argument is “acceptable 
as it stands.”2 Nevertheless, he insists that my critique “fails to touch”3 that 
argument. In what follows, I show that Oppy’s reasons for thinking so are 
spurious, since they are based upon () an unsuccessful attempt to show that 
theism and modal concretism are compatible, and (2) an account of begging 
the question which is entirely too permissive.
I
In “God and Modal Concretism,”4 I pointed out that while a modal the-
istic proof (hereafter, MTP) will no doubt presuppose the falsity of Lewis’s 
account of possible worlds, it does not follow (as Oppy asserts) that “it will 
rely on assumptions about the nature of logical space which can only be 
supported by the further claim that God actually exists.”5 I began by mak-
ing things harder for myself, presenting a series of reasons for thinking that 
“necessary being” theism (T) is incompatible with modal concretism (C)—
roughly, Lewis’s idea that possible worlds are maximal physical objects, that 
modal property possession is to be defined in terms of counterpart theory, 
and so on. Here I was simply following Oppy’s lead in assuming “that there 
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are just two different accounts of the nature of logical space between which 
we must choose—the account offered by Lewis, and the account offered by 
the theist.”6 This is perhaps an oversimplification; still, as Oppy notes,
for the purposes of illustrating divergent conceptions of logical space, 
it seemed to me that there was an advantage in working with Lewis’s 
modal realism simply because of the vivid picture that it presents of 
the metaphysics of modality.7
Agreed.
Now if T and C are incompatible—that is, if ~(T&C)—it follows that 
C⇒∼T. Relying upon C in a theistic proof is therefore ill-advised, since it 
entails atheism. But of course ~(T&C) also entails T⇒~C,8 which raises a 
different problem. Would it not then be a case of circular reasoning to assume 
~C in an MTP? After all, ~C is an entailment of theism itself. The question 
is whether this is objectionable. And if so, how so? To complicate matters, 
I noted that there are different accounts of “circularity” on offer; indeed, 
there is serious and heated debate over which of these best explains why 
circular arguments should be classified as defective or fallacious.9 Unfor-
tunately, while Oppy’s 993 paper includes the accusation of circularity, it 
fails to include any account of what he has in mind. I therefore explored vari-
ous possibilities on his behalf, concluding that the problem could lie neither 
with logical or epistemic circularity; nor could it be due to Oppy Circularity 
(OC)—a malady of his own invention. I ended by briefly sketching an MTP 
immune to all of Oppy’s criticisms.0
The crucial thing to see is that if theism and concretism are incompat-
ible, that only makes the alleged circularity problem more acute. It is there-
fore something of a surprise to see Oppy disputing this incompatibility vig-
orously and at such length. If he is right, my job becomes all the easier (and 
his, I am afraid, all the harder). But is Oppy right? Well, I do not think so. 
Oppy’s specific complaints focus on the arguments I gave to show that there 
is no way for God to exist in a Lewis world. There is no dispute here over 
this or that premise as one would expect. Rather, what Oppy wants to say is 
that while theism is inconsistent with Lewisean concretism (C), it is perfectly 
compatible with concretism more broadly construed (call this “C*”):
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If we combine theism with concretism, then it isn’t true that worlds 
are maximal physical objects: rather, worlds are mereological sums, 
of which at most one part is a maximal physical object. Theists who 
agree with Davis that God might not have created will suppose that 
there is at least one possible world in which there is no physical part; 
theists who think that God could not have failed to create will suppose 
that there are no possible worlds that have no physical part.
He then concludes that “Davis’s arguments for inconsistency between theism 
and concretism fail.”2 But this is a whopping non sequitur. What follows, at 
best, is only that my arguments fail to show that T and C* are incompatible. 
But since that was no part of my project, it is hardly an objection.3 And this 
is all beside the point anyway; none of this even slightly advances Oppy’s 
central claim that a theist’s assumptions about modality “can only be sup-
ported” by presupposing theism. (You will notice that in his present contribu-
tion, this claim is dropped entirely.)
At any rate, how does merely announcing that worlds are mereological 
sums demonstrate or prove that T and C* are compatible? Well, it does not 
by itself. So Oppy adds that God’s existing necessarily can be understood in 
terms of his having a counterpart in each of these mereological sums. To say 
that God necessarily has his omni-properties means that “in each one of the 
worlds, the counterpart of God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood, eter-
nal, and the creator of the world ex nihilo.”4 Here we can safely ignore this 
idea that God necessarily creates, and that each world therefore has a maxi-
mal physical object (MPO) as a part. For this implies that God creates by the 
necessity of his nature, that creation is not the free act of a personal cause or 
agent, and that matter is logically necessary. Only Spinoza and his followers 
would dream of saying such things.5 This is no tenet of classical theism.
What about this idea that God has counterparts? What is that supposed 
to mean? What is a counterpart? The grandfather of counterpart theory, Da-
vid Lewis, explains:
I prefer to say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you 
have counterparts in several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble 
you closely in content and context in important respects. . . . But they 
are not really you. For each of them is in his own world, and only you 
are here in the actual world.6
11. Oppy, “Reply to Richard Davis,” 431.
2. Ibid.
13. Oppy’s “Modal Theistic Arguments” knows nothing of worlds as mereological sums, 
containing at most one maximal physical object as a part.
14. Oppy, “Modal Theistic Arguments,” 18–1.
5. Thus saith Samuel Clarke. See his A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God 
and Other Writings, ed. Ezio Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 998), 46.




Putting this together with Oppy’s suggestion, what we must envision, I sup-
pose, are distinct worlds each containing beings who possess the omni-prop-
erties, but who are not identical with each other or the God of the actual 
world. No doubt many of these worlds will have MPOs, and of course these 
too will be distinct. But at least one world will contain only a God counter-
part.
For the sake of simplicity, then, let us imagine there are only three 
“mereological worlds”:
(W) God + MPO
(W2) God2 + MPO2
(W3) God3
Notice that there is a God counterpart in each world; we have also got some 
worlds with MPO parts and others without. Doesn’t this automatically show 
that T and C* are compatible? By no means. First, if God ≠ God2 ≠ God3, 
then what we have is not “necessary being” theism, but rather a bizarre form 
of polytheism: multiple distinct omni-beings each existing in its own world.
Second, Lewis, Oppy, and the “necessary being” theist all hold that the 
nature and number of possible worlds is a matter of necessity. According to 
Lewis, for example, “it is not contingent what conditions the entire system 
of worlds does or does not satisfy.”7 Oppy concurs: “the nature of logical 
space cannot be a contingent matter.”8 But if so, every possible world will 
exist as a matter of necessity, in which case (if Lewis is right) each of W, 
W2, and W3 will have a counterpart in the others. But this is not possible. 
For one thing, W and W2 cannot have counterparts in W3 because W3 is an 
MPO-less world; as such, it cannot possibly contain (as a mereological part) 
an MPO resembling those in W and W2.
Furthermore, suppose MPO is as big as our cosmos, while MPO2 is 
quite small—perhaps only the size of a flea.9 Then it simply will not be pos-
sible for MPO2 to contain anything that closely resembles MPO, from which 
it follows that W will not have a counterpart in W2. Anyway you look at 
it, Oppy’s attempt to graft God into mereological worlds yields a contingent 
logical space; and this is not compatible with the modal framework required 
by “necessary being” theism. So it seems to me that Oppy’s “add on” to 
Lewis’s concretism is in serious trouble. Not only has Oppy failed to show 
how T and C* are compatible, we can (I believe) see quite clearly that they 
are not.
7. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 986), 25.
18. Oppy, “Modal Theistic Arguments,” 23.
1. Plantinga points out that on Lewis’s definition of “maximal physical object,” some Lew-
is worlds will be “no larger than a flea” (Alvin Plantinga, Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, 
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II
So we have this claim from Oppy that all MTPs are question-begging 
or circular. Well, how so? In what sense are they defectively circular? In a 
footnote, I briefly mentioned that it was not likely to be logical circularity 
that Oppy had in mind. For on his view, every valid argument is logically 
circular.20 Quoting William Rowe, Oppy tells us that logical circularity is 
present “when a premise in an argument, or a main conjunct of a premise, is 
identical to the conclusion.”2 Here I simply noted for the record that a simple 
little argument like (P&(P⊃Q)├ Q is valid, but it is not logically circular on 
the definition; for its conclusion, Q, does not appear as either a premise or 
a main conjunct of a premise. So we have a clear-cut counterexample to the 
general principle.
Here Oppy attempts to redefend his claim that all valid arguments are 
logically circular. On what seems to be his favored approach to the matter, 
the argument goes as follows:
if the argument, P, . . . , Pn therefore Q, is valid, then the conjunction 
(P& . . . &Pn) is logically equivalent to the conjunction (Q&(P& 
. . . &Pn)). Since the argument, (Q&(P& . . . &Pn)) therefore Q, is 
logically circular, we can then conclude that the argument, P, . . . , Pn 
therefore Q, is also logically circular.22
I have two observations. First, Oppy’s argument appears to be deductively 
valid. But if so, then it must be logically circular; that is what the conclusion 
of the argument says. So Oppy has used a valid, logically circular argument 
to prove that all valid arguments are logically circular. And isn’t that circu-
lar?
Secondly, the argument contains a false premise. Consider once again
() (P&(P⊃Q))├ Q.
() is indisputably valid; after all, it is modus ponens, everyone’s favorite 
argument form. But then if Oppy is right, “P&(P⊃Q)” is logically equivalent 
to “[P&(P⊃Q)]&Q.” And that is fair enough. But he then goes on to say that 
since
(2) ([P&(P⊃Q)]&Q)├ Q
is logically circular, so is (). But this inference is patently invalid; for while 
the premise of (2) has a main conjunct identical to the conclusion (namely, 
Q), this is manifestly not the case with (). Its conclusion appears neither as 
20. See Graham Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 995), 55.
2. Ibid., 54. The quotation from Rowe is from William Rowe, “Comments on Professor 
Davis’ ‘Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?’” International Journal for Philoso-
phy of Religion 7 (976): 443.
22. Oppy, “Reply to Richard Davis,” 432.
riChard davis 441
442 PhilosoPhia Christi
a premise nor a main conjunct of a premise. Hence it is not logically circular. 
Thus Oppy’s argument fails. Just because () is logically equivalent to an 
argument that is logically circular, it does not follow that (1) is also inflicted 
with logical circularity.
Is the alleged circularity crippling all MTPs perhaps epistemic in na-
ture? As Alston explains it, this defect occurs in an argument when we must 
presuppose its conclusion, in order to determine the truth of its premises, or 
be justified in accepting them.23 Here I showed how the theist need not rely 
upon theism itself in either rejecting concretism or adopting an alternative 
modal metaphysics. Notice that Oppy never disputes the point; he does not 
try to say that all MTPs are epistemically circular. He simply complains that 
on my account the argument A├ A is “a question-begging argument if ever 
there was one,”24 but it is not true that we must presuppose A to be justified 
in accepting A. That is right. But Oppy has badly confused the issue. I am 
not defending an account of epistemic circularity. Nor am I claiming that all 
question-begging arguments are epistemically circular. Why would I have to 
do a thing like that? Perhaps I would have obligations of this sort, if I were 
the one claiming that all MTPs were question-begging. But of course that is 
no part of what I am doing. So Oppy’s remarks here are well off the mark.
Finally, I explored the possibility that MTPs suffer from a very different 
sort of circularity—Oppy Circularity (OC):
[Suppose] that I am committed to a claim that p as part of my perhaps 
tacit reasonable commitment to a broader consistent set of claims C. 
Suppose further that an opponent produces an argument of the form 
‘Q, . . . , Qn therefore not p,’ where the negations of one or more of 
the Qi are claims that belong to C. then that argument begs the ques-
tion against me. Moreover, this is true even if I cannot provide a clear 
characterization of the set of claims C.25
It seems to me that being circular in this sense is no strike against an argu-
ment at all. And in fact, Oppy concedes that “(OC) isn’t quite right as a par-
tial characterization of begging the question.”26 Still, he thinks it has merit 
and chastises me for not saying what my reasons are for rejecting it: “It may 
be that Davis has good reasons for rejecting (OC). However, his telling us 
that he has such reasons doesn’t make it so.”27 No doubt. But I am afraid 
Oppy has taken the bait. Why this request for good clear reasons? (OC) does 
not mention needing anything like that. It only says that you have begged 
the question against me if you present me with an argument whose premises 
contradict things I am reasonably committed to. But this is altogether too 
23. See William Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 67 (986): 0.
24. Oppy, “Reply to Richard Davis,” 433.
25. Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God, 56.
26. Oppy, “Reply to Richard Davis,” 435.
27. Ibid.
easy. On this account, far too many arguments will turn out to be question-
begging. Indeed, as I pointed out, we can easily imagine a critic bringing this 
very same charge against Oppy upon being presented with (OC).28
What is Oppy’s response? Although (OC) says that the charge sticks 
even if the critic “cannot provide a clear characterization” of her reasons, 
Oppy will not have it. He insists on knowing whether the premises advanced 
by his critic are really good reasons—presumably, better reasons than his 
own. And that, I think, is actually the right thing to say. But it is said much 
too late in the game. The lesson to be learned is that I do not beg any ques-
tions against you by merely presenting you with premises that contradict 
things you are reasonable in believing given your other commitments. For it 
may be that you ought to accept my premises, since they are more reason-
able than your own. (Not all reasonable premises are created equal.) In cases 
like this, I submit, there are no questions begged at all. I only wish Oppy had 
adopted this dialectical mind-set from the start, and had provided us with a 
clear set of good reasons for thinking that all MTPs are question-begging. 
Unfortunately, so far as I can see, not only were the reasons not good, they 
were never really given.
28. This is especially likely since there is a current split between two rival hypotheses in the 
literature on begging the question: the epistemic theory (based on knowledge and belief) and the 
dialectical theory (based on commitment and dialogue). (OC) is a species of the latter, and is by 
no means lacking in critics whose reasonable commitments are contradicted by (OC)’s implicit 
premises. For further details, see Walton, “Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the 
Question,” 23–84.
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